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In life, risk is reward and vice versa. Unfortunately, the big rewards people desire are relatively unlikely
to occur. This relationship between risk and reward or probabilities and payoffs seems obvious to the
financial community and to laypeople alike. Yet theories of decision making have largely ignored it. We
conducted an ecological analysis of life’s gambles, ranging from the domains of roulette and life
insurance to scientific publications and artificial insemination. Across all domains, payoffs and proba-
bilities proved intimately tied, with payoff magnitudes signaling their probabilities. In some cases, the
constraints of the market result in these two core elements of choice being related via a power function;
in other cases, other factors such as social norms appear to produce the inverse relationship between risks
and rewards. We offer evidence that decision makers exploit this relationship in the form of a
heuristic—the risk–reward heuristic—to infer the probability of a payoff during decisions under
uncertainty. We demonstrate how the heuristic can help explain observed ambiguity aversion. We further
show how this ecological relationship can inform other aspects of decision making, particularly the
approach of using monetary lotteries to study choice under risk and uncertainty. Taken together, these
findings suggest that theories of decision making need to model not only the decision process but also
the environment to which the process is adapted.
Keywords: decisions under uncertainty, heuristic, bounded rationality, ecological rationality, risk
and reward
While God may not gamble, animals and humans do, and . . . they
cannot help but to gamble in an ecology that is of essence only partly
accessible to their foresight.
—Egon Brunswik (1955a, p. 236)
In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the empiricist
philosopher-cum-psychologist John Locke (1690/1959) empha-
sized the inescapable bounds of human knowledge. According to
Locke, humans conduct their lives—apart from a few essential
things they can be certain of and see in broad daylight, such as
their own existence and that of God—in the “twilight, as I may so
say, of probability, suitable, I presume, to that state of mediocrity
and probationership, he [God] has been pleased to place us in here”
(p. 498). How should we reason and act in this twilight? Part of an
answer had already been suggested in 1654, some decades before
Locke’s depiction of the human condition. In that year, the math-
ematicians Blaise Pascal and Pierre Fermat began an epistolary
exchange in which they discussed various gambling problems—in
other words, lotteries. Their correspondence formed the foundation
of the calculus of probability and mathematical expectation. Ex-
pectation, in turn, was soon to become the central doctrine of a
new brand of rationality, grounding choice in the maximization of
expected outcomes. Thus, a pragmatic rationality emerged that
abandoned ideals of certainty and was thought to describe how the
educated homme éclairé reasoned in what Locke portrayed as the
twilight of probability (Hacking, 1975).
Since Pascal and Fermat, lotteries have time and again played a
prominent role in the development of normative and descriptive
accounts of choice. Sets of equiprobable outcomes as produced by
gambling devices such as a fair coin or a die make it possible to
define probabilities in a nonarbitrary fashion (Gigerenzer et al.,
1989). Moreover, lotteries offer a simplified model of risky
choices in the world, displaying the key characteristics of risk and
rewards. Consequently, as Lopes (1983) put it, “the simple, static
lottery or gamble is as indispensable to research on risk as is the
fruitfly to genetics” (p. 137).
The focus on lotteries has impacted decision theory in many
different ways, including how researchers classify decisions. A
common distinction is between decisions under risk and decisions
under uncertainty (Knight, 1921). Decisions under risk refer to
situations where the probability distribution over the possible
outcomes is known, as is commonly the case in monetary lotteries.
Most experimental investigations of how people choose have
focused on decisions made under risk (see Weber, Shafir, & Blais,
2004). However, countless everyday decisions—which candidate
to support, which witness to believe, which venture to invest in,
which scientific theory to endorse, when to cross a busy street—
are made with limited or no knowledge of probabilities. In reality,
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humans often navigate not in the twilight of probability but in the
fog of uncertainty.
How people should and do reckon with uncertainty is one of the
most vexing problems in theorizing about choice. A number of
solutions have been proposed. One is to turn uncertainty into risk.
Savage (1954) and Ramsey (1926) proposed that “for a ‘rational’
man . . . all uncertainties can be reduced to risks” (Ellsberg, 1961,
p. 645) by replacing the objective probabilities in expected utility
theory with subjective ones. Moving from rational man to actual
people, psychologists have investigated two ways in which people
respond to uncertainty. One response is to intuit subjective prob-
abilities from knowledge and memory (Tversky & Fox, 1995). The
second is to sample the external world for information, thus
replacing uncertainty with what Knight (1921) called statistical
probabilities or probability values known only via samples of
information (Hertwig & Erev, 2009). We consider still another
process people may enlist to navigate the fog of uncertainty. The
process is inferential in nature and rests on the notion that prob-
abilities can be approximated from statistical regularities that
govern real-world gambles. Our account also aims to bring an
adaptive view to the inquiry of rational choice.
An Adaptive View of Rational Choice
According to Simon (1956), “a great deal can be learned about
[boundedly] rational decision making . . . by taking account of the
fact that the environments to which it [the organism] must adapt
possess properties that permit further simplification of its choice
mechanisms” (p. 129). On this view, human cognition reflects and
exploits statistical regularities in the world. This has been found to
occur with perceptual processes (Brunswik, 1940; Gibson, 1979;
Proffitt, 2006; Shepard, 1990, 1994), memory and categorization
(Anderson, 1991; Anderson & Schooler, 1991), and inferential
processes (Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler & Juslin, 2006; Juslin, 1994).
Moreover, environmental regularities have been suggested to be
the foundation of simplifying mechanisms that exploit such regu-
larities in the service of good performance (Gigerenzer, Todd, &
the ABC Research Group, 1999; Hertwig, Hoffrage, & the ABC
Research Group, 2013; Simon, 1955; Todd, Gigerenzer, & the
ABC Research Group, 2012).
One way to conceptualize how people exploit ecological regu-
larities is with Brunswik’s (1940, 1952) probabilistic functional-
ism (see also Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004; Hammond &
Stewart, 2001). Probabilistic functionalism rests on two principles.
The first principle is that people do not act or perceive for the sake
of acting or perceiving. They do so to achieve specific ends
(functionalism). These ends can be basic, such as obtaining food,
avoiding danger, or predicting a competitor’s behavior, or they can
be more intricate, such as investors identifying the most profitable
stocks to buy. Irrespective of the ends, people often do not have
direct access to or direct knowledge of the criterion of interest
(e.g., the distance of an object, the likely strength of a competitor,
the likely value of a good or an alternative). Instead, they need to
infer the distal criterion from proximal cues that are probabilistic
indicators of the criterion. This probabilistic inference process is
the second principle, thus the name probabilistic functionalism. In
terms of decision making under risk and uncertainty, payoffs,
probabilities, ambiguity or lack thereof (Ellsberg, 1961), and an-
ticipated or experienced affect (Damasio, 1994; Mellers, Schwartz,
Ho, & Ritov, 1997) are just some of the many possible cues that a
decision maker uses to infer the value of an alternative.
The Lens Model in Decisions Under Uncertainty
Brunswik’s (1952; see also Cooksey, 1996) lens model draws
together the key concepts within probabilistic functionalism (see
Figure 1). It shows the distal criterion on the left and the observed
response on the right. The functional validity, represented by the
arc between these two variables, measures the degree to which
the organism’s response (e.g., decision) attains the distal crite-
rion. The proximal cues mediate the relationship between the
distal criterion in the environment and the organism’s response.
Ecological validities measure the predictive strength of a cue with
regard to the distal criterion. Utilization validities measure the
extent to which the cues are predictive of the organism’s response.
Finally, the cues themselves are typically interrelated, thereby
allowing redundancy in predicting the distal criterion. When some
cues become unreliable or unavailable, the organism can exploit
this redundancy by substituting or alternating between different
cues. This is possible because of what Brunswik (1955b) called the
mutual substitutability or vicarious functioning of cues.
It is these properties of intercue relationships and substitutability
that we suggest offer a new perspective on how people make
decisions under uncertainty. Under uncertainty, cues such as the
payoffs associated with different courses of actions may be acces-
sible, whereas other cues—in this case, the probability with which
those payoffs occur—are not. This missing probability information
has been problematic for choice theories as typically both payoffs
and probabilities are used in determining the value of options and
in choosing (e.g., Bernoulli, 1954; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979;
Savage, 1954; Tversky & Fox, 1995; Tversky & Wakker, 1995;
von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). However, if payoffs and
probabilities are interrelated, then this ecological property can
permit the decision maker to infer hidden or unknown probability
distributions from the payoffs themselves, thus easing the problem



























































































































Environmental analyses of the relationship between payoffs and
probabilities or risks and rewards are lacking however. Therefore,
we first analyze the ecological relationships between payoffs and
probabilities across a variety of real-world environments. We also
discuss the possible driving forces behind the observed relation-
ships. Then, we investigate the extent to which people take advan-
tage of this relationship to make choices. In particular, we provide
evidence that people appear to use a simple heuristic, the risk–
reward heuristic, to infer unknown probabilities from observable
payoffs during decisions under uncertainty. We conclude by ex-
amining the implications of the heuristic and, more broadly, the
structural relationship between payoffs and probabilities for deci-
sion making under uncertainty.
An Ecological Analysis: Are Risk and
Reward Correlated?
Is there an environmental relationship such that reward could be
a proxy for risk? According to literary intuition, for instance, the
relationship is self-evident: “One doesn’t discover new lands with-
out consenting to lose sight of the shore for a very long time”
(Gide, 1973, p. 309). The same idea is echoed in the proverb
“Nothing ventured, nothing gained.” Likewise, the relationship is
taken for granted in the field of finance, where any casual search
of the Internet or of self-help books reveals statements such as
“understanding the relationship between risk and reward is a key
piece in building your personal investment philosophy” (Little,
2013, para. 2).
In order to go beyond anecdotal evidence, we conducted several
ecological analyses involving environments in which probabilities
are known or obtainable. This focus follows necessarily from our
goal to quantify the ecological relationship between payoffs and
probabilities. For two reasons, we start our ecological analyses by
considering the environments of monetary lotteries. First, mone-
tary gambles and chance devices are a ubiquitous property of
human ecology. In 2009, for instance, $34.6 billion was spent at
commercial casinos in the United States (American Gaming As-
sociation, 2011). In that same year, state lotteries sold $52 billion
dollars’ worth of lottery tickets (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). On
average, this means households spent $484 on lotteries, which is
more than the $435 that the average U.S. household spent on
alcoholic beverages that year (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009).1
At the other end of the lottery spectrum, the average U.S. house-
hold spent approximately $309 on life and other personal insur-
ance (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009). Because of their omni-
presence, monetary gambles may afford people one of the clearest
views onto the statistical structure of an environment. Our second
reason for initially focusing on lotteries was, admittedly, conve-
nience: Lotteries provide reasonably accessible ecologies for a
quantitative examination of the risk–reward relationship. We first
consider one of the most popular and common casino games,
roulette.
Roulette
In roulette, a ball is spun around a wheel with 38 pockets labeled
1 to 36, plus 0 and (in American, but not European, roulette) 00.
The odd numbers are red, and the even numbers are black. The
player places a bet (e.g., $1) on one or more outcomes occurring
(e.g., the ball stopping on pocket 12). If the ball lands on one of the
player’s selected outcomes, the payout is (36 n)/n, where n is the
number of outcomes the player is betting on plus the original
wager. Each of the 155 possible bets (22 unique bets) has an
expected loss to the player (in American roulette) of 5.3 cents for
every $1 spent (2.7% of the wager in European roulette). The
simplicity of roulette renders obvious the inverse relationship that
exists between payoffs and probabilities across all 155 gambles,
where the higher the payoff, the less likely the event is to occur
(see Figure 2). Less obvious is that the functional relationship
between probabilities and payoffs takes the form of a power
function, as the log-log plot in Figure 3A illustrates. We return to
why it takes the form of a power function shortly.
Horse Track
Does this relationship generalize to gambles that involve what
Knight (1921) called statistical probabilities whose values are
known only via samples of information? In order to find out, we
analyzed 34,443 bets offered at flat horse races in Britain between
1985 and 1995. Obtained by Jullien and Salanie (2000) from
RACETRACK Limited, the data set contains the number of horses
in each race, the odds or starting price of each horse at the time the
race began, and the order of arrival of the horses. With the large
number of races, we could estimate the probability that a horse
with particular odds won across all the races and years. There was
an average of 10.7 horses in each race. The odds ranged from clear
favorites (1 to 50) to incredible long shots (1,000 to 1), with the
average odds being 16.6 (Mdn  12, SD  18.1). The average
expected loss per £1 wagered was £0.16, with the loss falling off
as the odds increased. The power function relationship observed in
roulette also exists in horse betting. Figure 3B shows this relation-
ship between payoffs relative to a £1 bet and probabilities. Low
payouts are more likely to win the race, and the probability
decreases as the payout increases in accordance with a power
function relationship. Departure from linearity in the log-log space
occurs when the odds offered are less than 1, which is also
consistent with a power function.
Life Insurance
Does the negative relationship between payoffs and probabili-
ties also extend to life insurance? We examined the risk–reward
relationship in the pricing of voluntary group term life insurance
offered in 2010 at a large Midwestern university. This insurance is
an optional benefit offered in addition to the life insurance plan in
which employees are automatically enrolled. The term life premi-
ums consist of biweekly payments that differ according to age
group (under 35, 35–39, 40–44, . . . , and 80–84).2 The payouts
are expressed relative to $1 spent on premiums. In order to
determine the probability of a payout, we used a 2007 period life
table from the U.S. Social Security Administration (n.d.) and
averaged across the given ages and across gender (for the “under
1 Forty-two states had lotteries in 2009. The number of households in
each state was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau (2011).
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35” group, ages 22–34 were averaged). As Figure 3C shows, a
negative power function relationship also emerged between pay-
offs and probabilities in this domain.
Farmers’ Gamble: Artificial Insemination
of Dairy Cows
What about real-world gambles beyond monetary lotteries?
Farmers, on a daily basis, take highly consequential bets, from
when to plant and harvest their crops to how to manage their
livestock. One bet dairy farmers regularly make is on the specimen
of bull semen used to artificially inseminate their cows. To do so,
they are given a catalogue listing the semen currently available
from different sires. For each specimen, approximately 32 differ-
ent properties associated with the sire and his offspring are re-
ported (e.g., fat and protein content of the milk from daughters of
that bull, daughters’ calving ease). In order to render selection
easier, farmers are typically advised to focus on two numbers: an
index called lifetime net merit and the sire conception rate (Krin-
gle, 2008; Schnell, 2008).3 The lifetime net merit is an estimate of
the average improvement in profit that a dairy farm can expect
from the daughters of a specific bull; the sire conception rate is an
estimate of the conception rate of the sire’s sperm.4 In other words,
the lifetime net merit is the payoff, and the sire conception rate is
the probability.
Do farmers make their selections in an environment in which
risk and reward are negatively correlated? We obtained data for all
Holstein sires from a Genex Cooperative catalogue in May 2012.
The Holstein breed had the largest list of available samples for sale
(N  165), and the sire conception rate (in terms of predicted
deviations from the average rate for the farm) was reported for 136
of them. Figure 4A plots these deviations. Although the relation-
ship is too noisy to evaluate whether it takes the form of a power
function, there is nevertheless a negative relationship between the
lifetime net merit and the sire conception rate, with a Pearson
correlation of r.39 (95% highest density interval [HDI]:.53
to .25).5
Academics’ Gamble: Publishing in Good Journals
Where dairy farmers worry about the quality of their livestock,
academics worry about where to publish their manuscripts. Pub-
lishing fast and in high-impact journals is the supposed prerequi-
site for a successful professional career and tenure—thus the
phrase publish or perish (Garfield, 1996). As a result of this
pressure, academics face the gamble of where to submit a manu-
script for publication. Beyond the fit between the manuscript’s
content and the journal’s scope and readership, authors tend to
consider two key aspects: the relative importance of the journal
and its acceptance rate. Importance is usually indexed by a jour-
nal’s impact factor, defined as the ratio of the number of citations
of articles published in the journal relative to the total number of
articles published in it over a 2-year period (Garfield, 1955, 1972).
The acceptance rate is the proportion of all submissions that are
published in a given year.
Impact factors and acceptance rates map onto payoffs and
probabilities, respectively. Does a negative correlation between
payoffs and probabilities exist in this domain as well? Many
authors suspect that journals with the largest impact factors tend to
have the lowest acceptance rates, and at least in the area of
ecology, this seems to be the case (Aarssen et al., 2008). In order
to investigate this question further, we compiled a list of all
journals associated with psychology and/or psychiatry in 2010 by
either Thomson Reuters Journal Citation Reports (N  608),
Cabell’s Directories of Publishing Opportunities (N  743), or the
American Psychological Association (2011; N  59), resulting in
in N  1,043 journals. Thomson Reuters Journal Citation Reports
was our primary source of impact factors and Cabell’s Directories
of Publishing Opportunities, our primary source of acceptance
rates. Impact factor and acceptance rate were listed for 285 jour-
nals. An initial investigation of the data revealed that subdisci-
plines within psychology had different baselines for impact factors
and acceptance rates.6 To account for these differences, Figure 4B
plots the relationship between acceptance rate and impact factor as
z scores for each subdiscipline. To estimate the correlation, we
modeled this relationship hierarchically, with each subdiscipline
having its own mean and standard deviation of acceptance rate and
impact factor, as well as correlation between the two (see Appen-
dix A for a description of the model). The posterior estimate of the
modal correlation at the level of psychology is r  .26 (95%
HDI: .38 to .13).
3 Personal communication with Jeff Pleskac (August 2008).
4 The sire conception rate is calculated by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. It measures the rate of pregnancies via artificial insemination
for a bull. It is technically a deviation score controlling for various aspects
of the herd.
5 We estimated the posterior distribution over the correlation coefficient
using Markov chain Monte Carlo methods (Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013).
6 Subdisciplines were determined by the 11 subdisciplines of psycholo-
gy/psychiatry journals used by Thomson Reuters Journal Citation Reports.
Of the 608 journals, 84 had multiple subdisciplines. These were assigned
to the subdiscipline listed first in the database, which in nearly all cases
appeared to be the primary subdiscipline of the journal.

























































































































Proposers’ Gamble: Suggesting a Division in the
Ultimatum Game
Publishing in scientific journals is a social game in which
authors compete for a scarce commodity, that is, a slot in the
limited pages of a high-impact journal. A more generic social
game is the ultimatum game that experimental economists and
others have long employed to study bargaining behavior (Güth,
Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). In its simplest form, the ulti-
matum game involves two people who play a single round in
which one person, the proposer, suggests how to split a fixed
monetary pie. This split represents a take-it-or-leave-it offer (an
ultimatum) that the other person, the responder, must accept or
reject.
Normatively, according to standard economic theory, there
ought to be no uncertainty in this game. That is, the self-interested
payoff-maximizing responder should accept any positive payoff,
no matter how small, and the self-interested payoff-maximizing
proposer should allocate the smallest possible amount to the re-
sponder and pocket the lion’s share. Thus, rational economic
theory predicts that no relationship should emerge between the
payoff and the probability of rejection. In practice, however, real
responders frequently reject low offers (Camerer, 2003; Güth &
Tietz, 1990). Consequently, the proposer faces a gamble in which
offering too little increases the chances of the offer being rejected
and offering too much means overpaying in the settlement reached.
Given this tradeoff, it is possible that a negative relationship arises
between risk and reward even in this social game. To find out
whether this is indeed the case, we reanalyzed data from Fisch-
bacher, Fong, and Fehr (2009), where the proposer was given 100
points (exchangeable for real money).7 Figure 4C plots the prob-
ability of an offer being accepted as a function of the amount the
proposer kept. Indeed, as the amount the proposer retains in-
creases, the probability of the offer being accepted decreases. In
other words, the risk–reward relationship exists not only in games
against nature (e.g., monetary lotteries) but also in social games.
To summarize, we examined six diverse environments of risky
choice—some involving probabilities known (in principle) a priori
because of well-defined random mechanisms, others involving
statistical probabilities and less obvious mechanisms generating
relationships between outcomes and payoffs. We consistently ob-
served a negative relationship between probabilities and outcomes,
with larger rewards (payoffs) being associated with more risk
(smaller probabilities). This negative relationship appears to take
the form of a power function, especially in those environments in
which probabilities and outcomes can be measured without much
noise and where there is a large range of payoffs.
How Does the Ecological Risk–Reward
Relationship Arise?
What causes risk and rewards to be inversely tied in the envi-
ronments considered? With no claim to completeness, we identify
three relevant forces, of which only the first two are consistent
with standard economic theory; the third illustrates that factors
beyond a competitive marketplace can also independently produce
the risk–reward relationship.
Fair Bets
The forces of the marketplace are sufficient to give rise to a
negative relationship between probabilities and payoffs and some-
times even sufficient to produce a power function relationship
between the two (as shown in Figure 3).8 This is because decisions
involving risk and uncertainty often occur in the course of an
interaction between two parties: a player (e.g., a gambler) and a
seller (e.g., the house). The seller has a gamble that has the
prospect of gaining g if an event A occurs with a probability pg and
offers the player this gamble at a price l. Naturally, the player
desires a high payoff, with the highest of probabilities and at the
lowest cost. The seller has the opposite aspiration. These opposing
7 We are grateful to Urs Fischbacher for this data (Fischbacher et al.,
2009). In this condition of Fischbacher et al.’s (2009) experiment, a total
of 46 participants made 10 offers anonymously to 10 other real partici-
pants.
8 Many environmental magnitudes exhibit a power law relationship with
their corresponding frequencies (Bak, 1999; Gutenberg & Richter, 1965;
Ijiri & Simon, 1977; Mandelbrot, 1982; Zipf, 1949). However, the rela-
tionship between payoffs and probabilities in gambles is different in that it
arises between, and not within, distributions.
Figure 3. Relationship between payoffs and probabilities (plotted in log-log space) in three domains of life’s
gambles. All the payoffs have been transformed to be relative to $1 or £1 spent. The solid line is the estimated
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forces lead to a Pareto-efficient state such that lotteries are pushed
toward a fair bet, in which expected gains correspond to expected
losses such that
pg · g [1 pg] · l (1)
(Osherson, 1995; Skyrms, 1966). Reworking this equation, we can
say that a gamble is fair if and only if
pg l ⁄ (l g). (2)
The fair-bet definition is fundamental to many aspects of economic
theory, including the efficient market hypothesis (Samuelson,
1965). One immediate psychological implication is that a decision
maker can take advantage of the ratio c  l/(l  g) to heuristically
decide whether to accept a bet. Specifically, she can evaluate
where her personal belief that an event will occur, spg, rests
relative to c. If spg c, then she should take the bet; otherwise, she
should reject the bet. Indeed, poker players are instructed to use
this heuristic when they estimate the chances of winning (card
odds) and compare it with the ratio of the cost of a call to the total
amount of possible winnings (pot odds).
A second implication of the fair-bet assumption concerns the
structure of the ecology. In a competitive marketplace, gambles
will be selected that offer approximately fair bets, thus resulting in
a Pareto frontier between probabilities and payoffs. This frontier
suggests that for gambles that offer a chance to win a single payoff
for the cost of l, the probability of a gain pg will be equal to the
ratio of losses to the total amount being wagered:
pg [(g l) ⁄ l]1. (3)
This functional relationship arises regardless of the true probabil-
ity distribution of the event in question: Fair bets about normally
distributed events, uniformly distributed events, exponentially dis-
tributed events, and so on will result in a power function relation-
ship between payoffs and probabilities.
How closely do our choice environments correspond to this
power function relationship? We plotted the predicted probability
under the assumption of a fair bet for each of the binary monetary
gambles in our ecological analysis (see Figure 3). Table 1 lists the
mean absolute deviation between the estimated probabilities (as-
suming fair bets) and the implied or true probability of the event
occurring. Across all three domains, the probabilities and payoffs
fall surprisingly close to the predicted probabilities from a fair bet.
In roulette and horse racing, the predicted probabilities of winning
from a fair bet fall short of the true probabilities. This is, of course,
by design. In these domains, the seller implements various adjust-
ments that bias the gambles toward the house, and the predicted
probability from a fair bet thus overestimates the chances of
winning in these domains. In contrast, in the domain of life
insurance, the predicted probability from a fair bet undershoots the
probability of a death. Again, this is by design. The underestima-
tion is due to the fact that employees pay only part of the premium
and to the natural pooling of premiums across people helping to
offset costs. Nevertheless, across all three domains, people would
Table 1
Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) Between Observed Probability
of a Win and the Estimate From a Fair Bet Across the
Three Domains
Domain MAD (SD)
Roulette table .005 (.005)
Horse track .04 (.04)
Life insurance .017 (.020)
Figure 4. Relationship between payoffs and probabilities in three real-world domains beyond monetary
lotteries. Panel A plots the relationship between probabilities and payoffs from gambles a dairy farmer takes
when selecting semen to artificially inseminate his or her cows. Both lifetime net merit (payoff) and sire
conception rate (probability) are deviation scores from the average value of the herd/farm. Panel B plots the
relationship between payoffs and probabilities in a gamble a scientist in the psychological sciences faces when
choosing where to submit a paper. The impact factor and acceptance rates are z-scored within a subdiscipline.
Panel C plots the relationship between probabilities and payoffs in the ultimatum game from the perspective of






































































































arrive at a relatively accurate estimate of the probability of a
payoff by simply taking the ratio of losses to wins.
Filtering of Dominated Options
Although this quantitative result appears specific to monetary
gambles, in qualitative terms, market forces can also be understood
as responsible for the relationship observed in the domains of
artificial insemination of dairy cows and publishing scientific
papers. Dairy farmers, of course, do not want to purchase domi-
nated options: semen samples that have a low sire conception rate
and a low lifetime net merit. Thus, companies only sell semen
samples that are high on lifetime net merit, sire conception rate, or
both, removing semen samples with both low sire conception rate
and low lifetime net merit from the reference class. This filtering
of inferior options is sufficient to produce a negative association
between the two quantities.9 In a similar manner, the market can be
understood to drive the relationship between impact factor and
acceptance rate in academic journals. Journals with the largest
impact factors are the most prestigious and receive most submis-
sions. Space is limited in journals, leading to lower acceptance
rates in journals with the highest impact factors.
Fairness During Bargaining
There are, however, cases in which forces other than market
competition produce the risk–reward relationship. The ultimatum
game is one example. According to the canonical model in eco-
nomics, which considers people to be rational and self-regarding
(see Camerer & Fehr, 2006), no risk–reward relationship should
arise in this game. Yet it does. How, then, can it be explained? As
is the case in many actual social exchanges, concerns of fairness
enter the bargaining process during the ultimatum game (Bolton &
Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993). Violations
of fairness (here, exceedingly unequal distributions of the pie) risk
punishment (i.e., rejection of the proposed allocation). Indeed,
many people are willing to voluntarily incur costs to punish others’
violations of fairness (de Quervain et al., 2004; Yamagishi, 1986).
Because of this willingness and because proposers anticipate this
threat, a potentially risk-free exchange turns into an uncertain
gamble, exhibiting the same risk–reward relationship that market
competition produces.
To conclude, competition in the marketplace can often give rise
to a negative relationship between probabilities and payoffs and is
sometimes even sufficient to produce a power function relation-
ship between the two. However, this is not always the case. In
some situations, like the ultimatum game, economic forces should
give rise to no relationship at all between risk and reward, and yet
a risk–reward relationship still emerges due to what appears to be
social concerns of fairness.
The Risk–Reward Heuristic: A Way to Reckon
With Uncertainty
Across a range of environments, we found two cues to a pros-
pect’s value—the payoffs and their probabilities—to be interre-
lated. This intercue relationship can be exploited when one cue
becomes unavailable, as is the case when probabilities are un-
known in decisions under uncertainty. This capacity is captured by
the concept of vicarious functioning: An organism can cope with
cues that have become unreliable or unavailable by learning to
alternate between different cues (cue substitution) through their
mutual intersubstitutability (Brunswik, 1952). Thus, a person can
gauge the probability of payoffs within a lottery by estimating the
ratio of the cost of playing to the total amount of possible win-
nings. We call this shortcut the risk–reward heuristic, and its
process can be stated as follows:
For gambles that offer a single positive payoff and otherwise nothing,
infer the probability of winning a payoff, pg, from the ratio of the cost
of playing to the total amount of possible winnings as follows:
pg l ⁄ (l g).
The probability of not winning and being out the price l of the
gamble can be estimated by taking the complement of the proba-
bility of a positive payoff, pl  1  pg. We have specified the
heuristic to estimate the probability of a payoff in those decisions
in which a player pays a fixed price to participate in a gamble
offering the chance to win a desirable payoff and otherwise noth-
ing. Many decisions like the ones in our ecological analyses take
this structure. Of course, there are also other types of gambles,
such as those dealing only with losses or with multiple payoffs. For
now, we focus on gambles that primarily have a pay-to-play
structure with the opportunity of a single possible payoff. Later in
the discussion, we address how the heuristic may be applied to
other types of gambles.
From Inference to Choice
The risk–reward heuristic is agnostic regarding the further pro-
cessing of the inferred probability. It does not specify a choice
mechanism that spells out how the inferred probability of winning
the bet (pg) is used in making a choice. In principle, however, the
same processes are feasible that have been proposed in decision
making under risk, when probabilities and outcomes are known.
For instance, the decision maker could calculate the expected
payoff of an option offering the payoff g (and 0 otherwise) by
multiplying g with pg and could then maximize (expected value
theory). Similarly, the inferred probability could be entered in an
expected utility model that multiplies the subjective value of the
payoffs u(g) with pg. Alternatively, it could be subjected to some
form of distortion via a probability weighting function (as in the
two-stage model of decisions under uncertainty; Fox & Tversky,
1998), or it could represent one input into a choice heuristic
(Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006; Payne, Bettman, &
Johnson, 1993; Tversky, 1969).
Alternative Conceptions of the
Risk–Reward Relationship
The risk–reward heuristic envisions that when faced with choice
under uncertainty people infer that the probability of an event is
9 Consistent with this explanation, the correlation between sire concep-
tion rate and lifetime net merit in the sample (N  1,905) of all possible
Holstein bull semen specimens from which companies take a subsample is






































































































2006 PLESKAC AND HERTWIG
negatively related with the magnitude of the payoffs. This view
conflicts with other hypotheses about the relationship between
these two variables during decision making. For instance, accord-
ing to subjective expected utility theory (Savage, 1954)—the nor-
mative account of how people ought to make these decisions—
payoffs and probabilities are two independent factors that
determine the value of an alternative and, ultimately, choice. That
is, the utility of an alternative that yields outcome x if the event A
occurs otherwise 0, (x, A), is
u(x, A) p(A) · u(x) p( A) · u(0) p(A) · u(x), (4)
where event A is a subset of possible states of the world S, A  S.
The u is the utility function describing the subjective value of those
consequences. The p is a probability measure on the state space S
and reflects the decision maker’s subjective beliefs about the
likelihood of different states of the world occurring. However, note
that the probability is based on the event only and not on the
consequence of the event. Consequently, in subjective utility the-
ory, payoffs and probabilities are ultimately compensating but not
interacting factors in determining the value of the alternative.
Thus, if subjective expected utility theory is taken at first approx-
imation as a descriptive theory of choice, then a consequence of
this independence assumption is that the probabilities people use to
make decisions under uncertainty must be estimated independently
of the magnitudes of the payoffs.10
Still another view of the risk–reward relationship is implied by
the desirability bias. According to this bias, when payoffs become
more desirable, they are perceived as more likely than less desir-
able outcomes (Bar-Hillel & Budescu, 1995; Edwards, 1962; Ir-
win, 1953; Krizan & Windschitl, 2007; Windschitl, Smith, Rose,
& Krizan, 2010). This bias, however, is typically thought of as a
cognitive deficiency causing the desire for an outcome to inflate
people’s optimistic belief that good things coincide with attractive
probabilities. The risk–reward heuristic posits the opposite depen-
dency. Moreover, the root of the inverse relationship does not
reside in people’s pessimism but in the ecological structure of
gambles in the world.
Next, we examine these conflicting conceptions about how the
payoffs affect people’s beliefs during choice under uncertainty.
We first test people’s estimates in lotteries involving actual mon-
etary consequences before exploring in a second study whether
they also apply their ecological intuitions to hypothetical lotteries.
Finally, we explore the extent to which the heuristic can shed new
light on choices under ambiguity.
Study 1: Do People Exploit the Ecological Correlation
Between Payoffs and Probabilities?
To examine the extent to which people exploit the ecological
correlation between payoffs and probabilities, we offered partici-
pants the opportunity to play a gamble for real stakes, with the
chance of winning a prize. In order to play the gamble, they had to
pay a fee. They were not told what the chances of winning the
respective prizes were. Left ignorant of the chances of winning,
they could potentially employ the risk–reward heuristic, according
to which the estimated number of winning chances should de-
crease as the value of the payoff increases. Alternatively, their
choice could be driven by the desirability bias, according to which
the estimated number of winning chances should increase as
payoff magnitude increases, or they could strive to keep their
estimated probabilities independent of the payoffs, as subjective
expected utility theory would predict.
Method
Participants. One hundred and thirty-eight students from the
undergraduate research participant pool of the psychology depart-
ment of Michigan State University took part in the study for course
credit. They could also earn an additional but unstated amount of
money based on their performance. After giving their informed
consent, participants first searched for answers to difficult trivia
questions on the Internet. They were informed that if they an-
swered 20 questions correctly, they would earn $2. The task was
difficult, but everyone earned $2. After receiving the money, they
were informed that they could now play a gamble for real money.
Design and procedure. The gamble offered participants the
opportunity, at the expense of a $2 entry fee, to play a gamble with
the chance of winning $2.50, $4, $10, or $20 (between partici-
pants), respectively. The setup involved an envelope and a bingo
basket. Participants learned that if they chose to play, they would
first open the envelope and find out how many of the 100 marbles
(numbered 1 to 100) in the bingo basket would yield a winning
outcome. The number in the envelope was between 1 and 100.
After finding out this number, they would draw a marble, and if its
number was less than or equal to the number in the envelope, the
prize was theirs. The gambles were constructed—unbeknownst to
participants—to be fair, that is, the expected value of the gamble
matched the entry price of $2. Consequently, the number in the
envelope was, on average, 80, 50, 20, and 10 (winning marbles) for
the $2.50, $4, $10, and $20 lottery conditions, respectively. The
actual criterion value was determined by drawing the number from
a random uniform distribution with a width of 10 centered on each
fair value using a 10-sided die. We went to great effort to ensure
that participants were not aware of other prize conditions, includ-
ing only running one condition at a time (among the four possible
participants that could be run at a time) and asking participants not
to disclose the nature of the gambles they completed.
Before choosing whether to play the gamble, participants esti-
mated which number between 1 and 100 they expected to find in
the envelope (responses of 0 were permitted) and entered that
number on the computer. Next, they rated on a 100-point scale
anchored with not at all and absolutely their belief that each
five-unit interval (1 to 5, 6 to 10, . . . , 96 to 100) contained the
number. Finally, participants had the opportunity to play the gam-
ble. If they chose to do so, they paid $2 and completed the gamble;
otherwise, they left with the $2.
10 It is important to emphasize that Savage’s (1954) subjective expected
utility theory is a theory of choice. Utilities and probabilities are derived
from preferences over acts. It does not explicitly state how probabilities are
to be calculated. It does assume payoffs and probabilities are two inde-
pendent constructs that determine the value of the construct. For this
reason, we have stated the independence prediction—that probabilities be
estimated independently from the magnitude of the payoffs—as a conse-







































































































Consistent with the predictions of the risk–reward heuristic, the
estimated number of winning marbles in the basket decreased as
the dollar value of the gamble increased (see Figure 5).11 This
finding was supported by a beta regression with the values of the
prizes as predictors of the estimated number in the envelope
(winning probability). In the regression, the mean of the beta
distribution was a linear function of the dollar value condition via
a logit link, making the regression coefficients interpretable in
terms of changes in subjective odds (Ferrari & Cribari-Neto, 2004;
Smithson & Verkuilen, 2006).12 We used Bayesian analysis meth-
ods to estimate the posterior distribution over the model parame-
ters. The distributions were estimated with Markov chain Monte
Carlo methods (see Appendix A). With vague priors, the modal
posterior estimate for the regression coefficient on the dollar value
was b  0.025 (95% HDI: 0.053 to 0.002). In terms of odds
of winning, for every $10 decrease in the payoff of the gamble,
participants were 1.28 (95% HDI: 1.70 to 1.02) times more likely
to believe they could win.
As mentioned earlier, the risk–reward heuristic is not a choice
heuristic. A choice rule is therefore needed to make predictions
about people’s choices. One straightforward rule is that partici-
pants use the estimate from the risk–reward heuristic to calculate
the expected value of the lottery and then choose the option with
the larger expected value. This choice rule combined with the
risk–reward heuristic predicts indifference between paying to play
the lottery or not across all prize conditions. However, the choice
proportions (see Table 2) reveal an overall propensity to play the
gamble that increases with dollar outcome value. This conclusion
is supported by a Bayesian logistic regression analysis of the
choice to pay to play using the respective dollar value of the
condition as a predictor (Kruschke, 2010). With vague priors,
the modal posterior estimate of the intercept was b0  0.21
(95% HDI: .43 to .81), indicating a bias to play the gamble.
Choice proportions also suggest that the preference to play in-
creased with payoff condition. Indeed, the modal posterior esti-
mate of the regression coefficient for the dollar value was b 
0.097 (95% HDI: 0.03 to 0.17), indicating that with a $10 increase
in the payoff, participants were 2.65 times (95% HDI: 1.36 to 5.48)
more likely to play the gamble.
Participants’ estimates of the number of winning marbles im-
pacted their choice to play the gamble. This can be seen at the
aggregate and individual levels. On the aggregate level, the grow-
ing appetite to play across the conditions was consistent with the
regressive pattern in the estimates of the number of winning
marbles, relative to the corresponding probabilities for a fair bet.
Specifically, participants’ estimates of the chances of winning
were lower than the fair-bet probabilities for the low-payoff con-
ditions, and they were also less likely to play the gamble. At the
same time, participants’ estimates were higher than the fair-bet
probabilities for the high-payoff conditions, and they were more
likely to play the gamble. At the individual level, within each
condition, people who estimated a lower number were less likely
to accept the lottery. This was confirmed by a logistic regression
using the numerical prediction and the payoff prediction as simul-
taneous predictors. The HDI for both coefficients did not contain
0. The modal posterior distribution estimate of the coefficient for
the numerical prediction was bpre  0.021 (95% HDI: 0.001 to
0.045). The estimate of the coefficient for the payoff amount was
bpay  0.13 (95% HDI: 0.05 to 0.21). Thus, even when the payoff
condition was controlled, participants’ judgments of the chances of
winning were predictive of their choice to play.
Discussion
Consistent with the risk–reward heuristic, participants’ esti-
mates of the chances of winning decreased as the size of the payoff
increased. Furthermore, their choices of whether to play were
predicted by those estimates (and the prizes). This pattern of
results implies that not only did the magnitude of the lottery payoff
inform people’s inferences about the probability of winning but
people’s inferred probabilities also impacted their preferences.
These findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis derived from
Savage’s (1954) subjective expected utility theory that the proba-
bilities are estimated independent of the payoffs. They are also
inconsistent with the desirability bias’s prediction that the per-
11 The estimates from the rating method proved highly correlated with
the single point estimates and thus are not reported here.
12 Following Smithson and Verkuilen (2006), we rescaled the 0 to 100
estimates to be on the 0 to 1.0 interval, thus effectively shrinking the
interval to a .0001 to .9999 interval and so avoiding zeros and ones.
















Figure 5. Box and whisker plots of the estimated number of winning
marbles in the bingo basket (see text). The dotted line plots the estimates
predicted by the risk–reward heuristic.
Table 2
Percentage of Participants Choosing to Play the Lottery in the
Bingo Basket Study With Real Monetary Consequences






Note. The study was implemented in the laboratory and involved real
monetary consequences (participants paid $2 for the right to play and





































































































2008 PLESKAC AND HERTWIG
ceived likelihood of an event occurring will increase as its out-
come is made more desirable.
The observed estimates did deviate from those of fair bets, the
latter being what an error-free variant of the risk–reward heuristic
would suggest. In particular, as Figure 5 shows, the estimates were
also regressive relative to the predictions of the risk–reward heu-
ristic (dotted line): They overshot the probabilities corresponding
to a fair bet for the high prizes and undershot the probabilities for
the low prizes. One possible explanation for this deviation is that
decision makers’ use of the risk–reward heuristic—like other
judgments—is not error free but perturbed by error from other
sources of information (Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994;
Hertwig, Pachur, & Kurzenhäuser, 2005; Juslin, Olsson, & Bjo-
erkman, 1997). This would be sufficient to produce the regressive
effect observed in the estimated number of winning marbles.
Study 2: Do People Deem Payoffs and Probabilities to
Be Dependent Even in Hypothetical Bets?
Hypothetical gambles are frequently used in research on behav-
ioral decision making, and it is argued that they are equally as valid
a measure of preference as lotteries involving real monetary con-
sequences. Moreover, they afford the experimenter control over
payoffs and probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and permit
inexpensive, fast, and convenient studies (Thaler, 1987). Do peo-
ple also apply their intuitions about the statistical structure of
lotteries to bets that, unlike those in Study 1, have no actual
monetary consequences? If this is the case, it will call into question
the assumption that probabilities are processed independently from
payoffs in lotteries that are constrained by market forces.
Method
Participants. One hundred and ninety-eight volunteers on
Amazon Mechanical Turk completed a short survey on decision
making. The sample included 81 males (41%), and the average age
was 32 years (SD  11.5). The modal level of education was a
bachelor’s degree (41%), and the modal description of employ-
ment status was a wage earner (45%). Participants were paid $0.15
for completing a 10-question survey that took just under 5 minutes.
Two respondents failed to complete the survey and were excluded.
Design and procedure. Initial pilot studies suggested that the
bingo basket paradigm used previously was too complicated to
communicate in an online format. Thus, we presented the follow-
ing simplified scenario:
Imagine you have been asked to play the following lottery. The lottery
offers the opportunity to win $X, but it costs you $2 to play. If you
choose to play you would pay the $2 and, without looking, draw a ball
from a basket. In the basket there are 100 balls. The balls are either
black or red. If the ball is red you will win $X; otherwise, if the ball
is black you will receive nothing. Thus, the number of red balls in the
basket determines the probability that you will win. You are less likely
to win the $X the lower the number of red balls in the basket.
Between participants, we set the dollar value to X  $2.50, $4,
$10, $50, or $100, respectively. Participants first estimated the
number of red balls (out of 100) in the basket. We then asked
whether they would pay $2 to play the gamble for $X if they had
the opportunity.
Results
As in Study 1, the estimated number of winning red balls in the
basket decreased as payoff increased (see Figure 6). A Bayesian
beta regression model supported this conclusion. With vague pri-
ors, the modal posterior estimate for the regression coefficient on
the dollar value was b  0.007 (95% HDI: 0.012 to 0.004).
In terms of their odds of winning, for every $10 decrease in the
payoff of the gamble, participants were approximately 1.08 (95%
HDI: 1.12 to 1.03) times more likely to believe they could win. As
expected, these were smaller effects than those obtained in Study
1, conducted in the laboratory and involving actual monetary
consequences. The distributions of the estimated number of win-
ning red balls also revealed even greater skepticism relative to the
previous study. For example, the median estimates for the $2.50,
$4, and $10 conditions were 20%, 50%, and 39%, respectively,
lower than in the previous study.13
The choice proportions, listed in Table 3, were also substantially
lower than in Study 1. Participants in the online study showed no
apparent preference to play the gamble. If anything, they showed
the opposite inclination. This was confirmed by a Bayesian logistic
regression of the choice to play with the payoff as predictor. The
modal posterior estimate of the intercept term was negative,
b0  1.23 (95% HDI: 1.67 to 0.81), indicating no bias to
play the gamble. As before and inconsistent with the assumption of
risk neutrality, the likelihood of participants choosing to play the
gamble increased with the size of the prize, bpay  0.017 (95%
HDI: 0.009 to 0.026; see Table 3). In terms of odds, these esti-
mates imply that with a $10 increase in the payoff, participants
were 1.18 times (95% HDI: 1.10 to 1.29) more likely to play the
gamble.
Similar to Study 1, participants’ estimates of the number of
winning marbles appeared to shape their choice to play the gamble.
At the aggregate level, people’s estimates overshot the fair prob-
abilities for high payoffs and undershot those for low payoffs (see
Figure 6). Finally, at the individual level, participants who esti-
mated a lower number were again less likely to play the gamble.
This was confirmed by a Bayesian logistic regression analysis of
the choice to play with the payoff and the numerical estimates for
the number of winning red balls as simultaneous predictors. The
HDI for both coefficients did not contain 0. The modal posterior
estimate of the coefficient for the payoff amount was bpay  0.02
(95% HDI: 0.01 to 0.03), and the coefficient for the numerical
prediction was bpre  0.02 (95% HDI: 0.002 to 0.03).
Discussion
Even when facing simple lotteries with hypothetical conse-
quences, participants use the size of the prize to infer the proba-
bility of winning. The evidence emerging from Studies 1 and 2
does not support a strong (error-free) form of the risk–reward
heuristic. Nevertheless, the observed negative correlations (see
Figures 5 and 6) between payoffs and inferred probabilities sug-
13 Comparison of the intercepts of the beta regressions from Studies 1
and 2 reveals the same pattern. In Study 2, b0  0.0860 (95% HDI:
0.395 to 0.173), whereas in Study 2 with hypothetical gambles,






































































































gest that the risk–reward heuristic strongly anchors people’s re-
gressed estimates.
Study 3: Ambiguity Aversion—A Possible
Consequence of Using the Risk–Reward Heuristic?
One interesting consequence of exploiting ecological structures
is that the risk–reward heuristic can make its users appear averse
to ambiguity. Ambiguity aversion refers to the phenomenon that
most people given a choice between two otherwise equivalent
options—one in which the probability information is given and the
other in which it is missing—avoid the option with missing prob-
ability information (Camerer & Weber, 1992). Consider, for ex-
ample, the choice between these two lotteries:
Lottery A: Win $100 if a red marble is drawn from an urn with 50 red
marbles and 50 black marbles.
Lottery B: Win $100 if a red marble is drawn from an urn with 100
marbles with an unknown proportion of red and black marbles.
Presented with such choices, people generally prefer A to B (Cam-
erer & Weber, 1992; Ellsberg, 1961; Fox & Tversky, 1995; Rode,
Cosmides, Hell, & Tooby, 1999; Yates & Zukowsky, 1976). This
preference is commonly interpreted in terms of ambiguity aver-
sion, based on the assumption that people are indifferent to betting
on red or black in either lottery. Consequently, they should be
indifferent between the two lotteries. The preference for A thus
suggests that, as Ellsberg (1961) argued, uncertainty cannot simply
be reduced to a probability, as subjective expected utility theory
would assume (Savage, 1954).
Why do people behave as if they were averse to ambiguity?
Numerous explanations have been proposed. These include the
role of (comparative) ignorance (Fox & Tversky, 1995), an evo-
lutionary predisposition to avoid variance (Rode et al., 1999), the
probability estimation process (Curley & Yates, 1989; Einhorn &
Hogarth, 1985; Trimmer et al., 2011), and suspicion that the
ambiguous urn is rigged (Binmore, 2007; Frisch & Baron, 1988;
Kühberger & Perner, 2003; Yates & Zukowsky, 1976). These last
two explanations—probability estimation and suspicion—are of
particular interest in the context of our ecological analysis, which
suggests that the belief in a skewed urn may reflect an ecologically
rational intuition about the structure of lotteries in the world and
not some internal bias. That is, can the risk–reward heuristic and
its exploitation of an ecological regularity account for some of the
ambiguity aversion effect?
Method
One hundred and twelve students from the University of Basel
were randomly assigned to two groups and were presented with the
aforementioned (hypothetical) choice between lotteries A and B.
The first group (n  60) was told to assume that the payoff for
drawing a red marble from either urn was 10 Swiss francs. The
second group (n  52) was told to assume that the payoff for
drawing a red marble was 1,000 Swiss francs.
Results and Discussion
The risk–reward heuristic predicts that the ambiguous or uncer-
tain option will become increasingly undesirable as the magnitude
of the payoff increases. The reason for this prediction is again the
negative relationship between payoffs and probabilities: With in-
creasing magnitudes of payoffs, their probability decreases (rela-
tive to indifference priors of .5). Consequently, the larger the
magnitude of the payoff (and the smaller its probability), the
more people can be expected to prefer the unambiguous urn.
Because the relative variance between the two lotteries remains
constant, the comparative ignorance that participants may experi-
ence (Fox & Tversky, 1995) or their inclination to avoid variance
(Rode et al., 1999) should remain unchanged between the two
groups. Consequently, the preference for the unambiguous urn
should remain constant across the two groups.
The results support the risk–reward prediction. In the 10 Swiss
francs condition, 63% (38/60) preferred the unambiguous urn with
a known 50:50 composition. In the 1,000 Swiss francs condition,
by contrast, 81% (42/52) preferred the unambiguous urn. With
vague priors, the modal estimate of the posterior difference be-
tween the estimates was .17 (95% HDI: .01 to .33). This change in
preference between 10 and 1,000 Swiss francs is consistent with
the notion that choices are based on intuitions that exploit payoffs
as proxies for probabilities. Indeed, Ward Edwards appears to have
anticipated such a partial explanation of ambiguity aversion: “High
positive or negative payoffs are typically associated with very low
probabilities, while mediocre or zero payoffs are typically associ-
ated with high probabilities. This, I assert, is simply a fact about
Table 3
Percentage of Participants Choosing to Play the Lottery in the
Online Bingo Basket Study With Hypothetical
Monetary Consequences























Figure 6. Box and whisker plots of the estimated number of winning red
balls in the basket in the online study. The dotted line plots the estimates





































































































2010 PLESKAC AND HERTWIG
the world in which we live” (personal communication quoted in
Lopes, 1983, p. 141). Our ecological analyses indeed corroborate
Edwards’s assertion.14
Accounting for people’s preference for the unambiguous urn in
terms of ecologically rational intuitions is not meant to supplant
the notion of ambiguity aversion. The point though is that ecolog-
ical structures and cognitive processes can and should be viewed
as working in tandem (see also Anderson, 1998; Brunswik, 1952,
1955b; Lopes, 1983; Simon, 1956). To this end, our ecological
analyses and the risk–reward heuristic complement the estimation
accounts of ambiguity aversion. They posit that, when faced with
the choice between lotteries A and B (see above), people gather
information to form an estimate of the probability of winning and
arrive at an estimate of less than .5. This is done via either an
asymmetrical adjustment downward from an anchor of .5 (Einhorn
& Hogarth, 1985) or an application of Bayes’s rule with prior
beliefs that treat probabilities less than .5 as more credible than
those above (Trimmer et al., 2011; Viscusi, 1989). Why these
properties exist is less clear. The risk–reward heuristic offers a
principled explanation of why, by suggesting that aversion to
ambiguity is (at least partly) due to an ecologically grounded belief
that high payoffs have a low probability of occurring.
General Discussion
How people reckon with uncertainty and make choices when the
probabilities of outcomes are not known has been a vexing prob-
lem for choice theories. We suggest that people navigate the fog of
uncertainty using, among other mental tools, a heuristic that infers
the probabilities from the known payoffs. We conducted ecolog-
ical analyses in diverse real-world environments and showed that
a robust environmental relationship exists between risk and re-
ward. Three empirical studies demonstrated different ways in
which this relationship informs people’s behavior when they
choose among monetary gambles in the gain domain. We now
discuss our adaptive view of choice under uncertainty and review
how and where this relationship between payoffs and probabilities
may arise in other domains.
How Generalizable Are the Risk–Reward Relationship
and Its Consequences?
Like any heuristic, the risk–reward heuristic is not a domain-
general tool. Its smart use is limited to domains in which there is
an inverse relationship between payoffs and probabilities. Accord-
ingly, it should not be used in environments with a positive
relationship between valued outcomes and their relative frequency,
where its application would lead decision makers astray. Such a
relationship may be found in the social domain, especially in areas
where what is the best return for the public is not identical with the
best return for the individual. For example, the public is better off
if individuals do not rob banks, run red lights, or evade taxes. The
individual, in contrast, may be better off doing any of these things.
As a result, formal (e.g., police, laws) and informal social institu-
tions (e.g., norms, conventions) aim to enforce the collectively
desirable behavior. Consequently, this collectively desirable be-
havior can be expected to be more common than the behavior that
may maximize (some) individual self-interests.
Repeated risk taking and the risk–reward relationship.
Our analysis of the ultimatum game (see Figure 4C) suggests that
market competition is not the only force underlying the risk–
reward relationship. Figure 7 offers another illustration of this fact.
It plots the relationship between female college students’ number
of sexual partners (1, 2–4, 5; self-reported) and percentage of
those women without a sexually transmitted disease (STD; e.g.,
chlamydial infection, gonorrhea, syphilis; self-reported). Women
with five or more sexual partners were 8 times more likely to have
one or more STDs than were women with just one partner (Joffe
et al., 1992). Equating a higher number of sexual partners with
higher reward—obviously a controversial notion—and the risk of
STD with the price for the chance of reaping this return, then
another strong risk–reward relationship emerges.
This time, however, it is not market competition or social norms
that produce it, but the forces of chance. Let us view the sexual
encounter with a new partner as a Bernoulli trial with two possible
outcomes, success (no STD infection) and failure (STD infection).
Each new partner represents an independent trial. Probability of
success k is then pk, where p is the probability of a success on any
given trial. An exponential relationship between risk and reward is
thus produced: The higher the reward (number of partners), the
lower the chance to escape an infection. This example illustrates
that for risky behaviors that people can engage in repeatedly—
from having unprotected sex to using illegal drugs—a negative
relationship may be brought about between probabilities and pay-
offs as a result of the stochastics alone.
Losses. Does the inverse relationship between probabilities
and the magnitude of outcomes extend to situations in which
people incur costs to prevent or offset losses? We suggest that the
answer is yes, especially in domains shaped by market competi-
tion. For instance, the failure rate within a product domain is likely
to be inversely related to the magnitude of the price. Yet there is
not always a straightforward rarity–severity relationship in the loss
domain. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, tens of millions were
affected by smallpox, and at least one fifth of those infected died
(Fenner, Henderson, Arita, Jezek, & Ladnyi, 1988). Smallpox was
a widespread and often lethal disease. Thus, as in the gain domain,
the ability to infer the probability from the magnitude of the loss
is domain specific. Moreover, other factors may shape the infer-
ence process in the area of losses, such as a motivation to over-
estimate severely negative events as a measure to prevent costly
errors and experiences of severe loss (Harris, Corner, & Hahn,
2009; Weber, 1994).
Multiple-outcome gambles. Does a risk–reward relationship
also arise for gambles with more than one possible payoff, such as
lottery tickets? We analyzed all 32 scratch-off lottery tickets
14 Edwards made this assertion in trying to explain a consequence of
ambiguity aversion known as Ellsberg’s paradox. One version of this
paradox asks people who have chosen between lotteries A and B (see text)
to choose again between A and B using the same urns, but now betting on
a black marble (rather than a red one) being drawn. People tend to choose
A again (the unambiguous urn), which is inconsistent with subjective
expected utility theory. Edwards suggested that an equivalent of the risk–
reward heuristic could explain this result if respondents ignored the in-
struction that only the payoffs changed and not the urns themselves. Our tests
of this conjecture suggest this is not the case. People generally believe the
purely verbal manipulation and still choose A both times. Moreover, this
pattern of choices proves largely independent of the dollar magnitude. This
suggests that the risk–reward heuristic can explain some aspects of ambi-






































































































available in the state of Michigan in March 2008. The average and
median number of prizes per ticket was 21 (SD  7), and the
average expected loss per $1 spent was $0.36 (SD  0.08).15
Figure 8A plots the relationship between probabilities associated
with each payoff (relative to $1 spent). The relationship (both
between and within tickets) takes an approximately linear form in
log-log space, again suggesting a power function relationship
between probabilities and payoffs.
Across the lotteries, the probabilities, much like their counter-
parts in the binary gambles, fall close to a Pareto frontier defined
by a fair bet. Calculating these fair-bet probabilities is by no means
as straightforward as in the previous ecologies (see Figure 3): In
multiple-outcome gambles, there are, by definition, degrees of
freedom in the distribution of probabilities. Nevertheless, Appen-
dix B describes how—using the stated outcomes and an estimate
of the expected winnings—probabilities can be inferred for gam-
bles like state lotteries that offer a chance to win a payoff from a
range of possible gains at fixed cost. On average, the true proba-
bilities deviated from these estimates of the fair-bet probabilities
by .017 (SD  .03). Figure 8 shows the relationship between the
true and fair-bet probabilities for the set of lottery tickets with
the smallest (see Figure 8B), median (see Figure 8C), and
largest (see Figure 8D) mean absolute deviations. In general, as
should be expected given that the lotteries are designed to make a
profit, the true probabilities fell short of the fair-bet probabilities.
The deviations, as the figures show, tended to be largest for the
payoffs with the highest magnitudes.
Nevertheless, the close correspondence between the true prob-
abilities and the fair-bet probabilities raises the question whether
people use a similar process to estimate the probabilities of
multiple-outcome gambles and use them to make a choice among
lottery tickets. It is not impossible that people use some expanded
version of the risk–reward heuristic to estimate the probabilities of
each of the possible payoffs. However, cognitively, the process
seems quite taxing. Alternatively, people in multiple-outcome
gambles may simplify the choice situation and focus only on the
overall probability of winning and losing, respectively, using their
personal estimates of the expected gains to estimate these proba-
bilities and to make a decision.
Risk as variance. The risk-as-probabilities approach is a com-
mon definition in the area of discrete monetary gambles. Alterna-
tively, risk can be operationalized as a function of variance—a
definition that is often used in research on risk perception (e.g.,
Luce & Weber, 1986), finance (e.g., Sharpe, 1964), and in areas
dealing with near-continuous distributions of possible outcomes. Is
the risk–reward relationship limited to risk defined in terms of
probability? For an answer, we can turn to theorizing in finance.
Both the efficient frontier in Markowitz’s (1952) portfolio theory
and the capital market line (Sharpe, 1964) depict an inverse rela-
tionship between risk and expected return in a risk–return space.
Furthermore, the assumption is that in selecting among different
assets, investors trade off greater variability for greater expected
returns. As a result, across different asset portfolios, a positive
relationship can be predicted between the variability of a portfolio
and the average return (or a negative risk–return relationship).
Indeed, there is some support for this prediction in the performance
of mutual funds (Sharpe, 1966; but see Fama & French, 1992). An
adaptive view of cognition, in turn, raises the interesting question
of how choice processes might have adapted to exploit this version
of the risk–reward relationship. We leave this question to future
research, but it opens the door for a better understanding of
decision making outside the laboratory.
Ecological Rationality and Other Strategies to Reckon
With Uncertainty
The risk–reward heuristic is an ecologically rational strategy
insofar as it exploits the statistical structure of gambling environ-
ments to substitute for missing probability knowledge (Todd et al.,
2012). To appreciate this aspect, it is useful to review how other
strategies for making choices under uncertainty handle the missing
probability information. Subjective expected utility theory implies
that a decision maker’s subjective beliefs concerning the event in
question are formed independently of the payoffs (Savage, 1954).
This independence assumption is reflected in more descriptively
plausible accounts of decision making under uncertainty whether
the probabilities are estimated—without reference to the associ-
ated payoffs—from a sample of possible outcomes (Hertwig &
Erev, 2009) or from a search of declarative or episodic knowledge
stored in memory (Fox & Tversky, 1998; Tversky & Fox, 1995).
These solutions waste an opportunity to arrive at an informed
estimate of the likelihood of obtaining a payoff by exploiting the
information encapsulated in the payoffs themselves.
Other strategies for making a decision in the face of uncertainty
forgo probabilities altogether and instead make a decision based
solely on the possible outcomes. Yet these strategies can also be
understood as making a bet about the structure of the environment.
The maximin rule (Savage, 1954), for instance, identifies the
lowest potential payoff across the alternatives available and
chooses the alternative whose lowest payoff is highest (thus max-
imizing the minimum payoff). Relatedly, the minimax rule (Sav-
age, 1951) also focuses on the worst possible case but minimizes
the maximum amount of regret a person would feel (regret defined
as the difference between the actual payoff and the maximum
payoff possible if the true state of the world were known). These
15 When the prize was something other than money (e.g., a car), we used
its cash value.
Figure 7. Percentage of women without any sexually transmitted disease
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pessimistic rules are optimal in hostile decision environments
where the worst that could happen will always happen. Alterna-
tively, decision makers might take an optimistic stance and choose
as if the best that can happen will always happen, maximax. Or, as
Hurwicz (1951) suggested, they could form a weighted average of
the minimum and maximum payoff for each alternative, thus
forming a pessimism–optimism index, and then choose the option
with the largest index. This approach assumes that the unknown
probabilities lie between the worst and best possible distributions
(Luce & Raiffa, 1957).
These strategies are indeed possible ways to make decisions
under uncertainty. However, as we have demonstrated, gambles in
the world often tend not to be composed of the least favorable
probability distribution (as assumed by maximin or minimax) or
the most favorable probability distribution (as assumed by maxi-
max). Instead, social and economic forces push the probability
distributions toward a Pareto-efficient frontier, thus permitting
ecologically smart choices based on inferences from the risk–
reward heuristic.
How Representative Are Laboratory Gambles?
According to our analyses, payoffs and probabilities are not
independent. This finding also pertains to the assumption that
monetary lotteries can stand in for all of life’s risky choices.
Kahneman and Tversky (2000) summarized such a notion, stating,
“As with the fruit fly, we study gambles in the hope that the
principles that govern the simple case will extend in recognizable
form to complex situations” (p. xi). One way to evaluate this
implicit or explicit hope has been to test predictions from the
theories developed around monetary gambles in the field with
real-world situations (for a review, see Camerer, 2000). Expected
utility theory, for instance, has grown into such a powerful theory
because it can account for a wide range of real-world phenomena.
Prospect theory has some of the same abilities. It appears to predict
actual horse-racing bets (using the very gambles we analyzed
earlier; Jullien & Salanie, 2000). Prospect theory also offers an
explanation for macrolevel phenomena such as the equity premium
puzzle (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995) or the purchasing of lottery
tickets (Clotfelter & Cook, 1989).
Our concern, though, is not one of fit. No doubt, with the right
parameters and additional auxiliary assumptions, existing theories
of risky choice can account for a wide range of real-world phe-
nomena. Our concern is that the ecological structure of the mon-
etary gambles may not be adequately represented in the laboratory.
Brunswik (1952, 1955b) articulated the problem more generally.
In his view, psychology’s accepted experimental method of sys-
tematic design, in which variables are often artificially untied,
creates stimuli that leave no room for organisms to exploit the
ecological structure they have adapted to. As a result, the gener-
alizability of the findings will be limited to the experimental
Figure 8. The relationship between payoffs and probabilities across all 32 scratch-off tickets for state lotteries
(Panel A). Panels B–D illustrate the relationship between the estimates of the fair-bet probabilities and the true
probabilities (see Appendix B). The Super 7s ticket has the smallest mean absolute deviation between the
estimated probabilities and the true probabilities (.010; Panel B), Criss Cross Cashword has the median mean
absolute deviation (.018; Panel C), and $50s Frenzy has the largest mean absolute deviation due to overesti-






































































































situation itself. Instead, Brunswik advocated the method of repre-
sentative design, in which an experimenter samples stimuli—much
like participants—representatively (e.g., randomly) on a number of
dimensions (e.g., cue validities, intercorrelations) from a defined
population of stimuli (Dhami et al., 2004).
It can, however, be difficult to evaluate the degree to which
studies in the laboratory are representative of the ecologies
outside it. Our analyses suggest a benchmark against which the
representativeness of monetary gambles in the laboratory can be
evaluated, namely, the degree to which they embody the neg-
ative correlation between payoffs and probabilities. We exam-
ined this benchmark across numerous laboratory gambling en-
vironments, including the extensive set of studies compiled in a
meta-analysis of risky choice (Weber et al., 2004). Across
gambles, the structures in the world are very different from the
risk–reward structures realized in the gambles representing risky
choices in laboratories. Figure 9 shows just one representative set
of environments (many other published studies exhibit the same
pattern) used to test prominent theories of risky decision making.
The relationships between payoffs and probabilities between gam-
bles depart greatly from the environments in Figures 3 and 4 and
reflect experimenters’ use of systematic and factorial manipula-
tions.
One difference between the laboratory ecologies and our sample of
real-world ecologies is the format of choice. All of the real-world
gamble environments that we investigated involve an economic ex-
change in which a person pays a fixed amount of money for the right
to play the gamble. None of the laboratory lotteries assume this
pay-to-play structure. Instead, researchers commonly ask participants
to choose between two or more lotteries or to judge the certainty
equivalent of a particular gamble (though see Juni, Gureckis, &
Maloney, 2012). Doing so can be understood as treating each decision
problem as a separate ecology. So, perhaps collapsing across each
decision problem is an unfair depiction of laboratory ecologies, and
each problem should be treated as its separate ecology. In fact,
commonly, each decision problem only contains nondominated op-
tions (i.e., no option is included that is inferior in all respects to the
other option). As we have discussed, eliminating dominated options is
sufficient to produce a negative relationship between payoffs and
probabilities. Thus, payoffs and probabilities within each decision
problem will be inversely related. However, a critical difference
between the domains in our ecological analysis and the decision
problems studied in the laboratory is that the laboratory problems
typically contain only two options per problem. This structure offers
enormous latitude to the negative relationship between payoffs and
probabilities—so much latitude that, across decision problems, one
and the same payoff magnitude can be associated with very small or
with very large probabilities. To appreciate this, consider the hypo-
thetical gambles from Kahneman and Tversky (1979). At the time of
their data collection, so they mentioned (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979,
p. 264), the median net monthly income of an Israeli family was
3,000 Israeli pounds. The payoffs in the neighborhood of this
value were associated with probabilities ranging from as little
as .002 to as much as .9 (see Figure 9, left-most plot in the top
panel)—a vast range of probabilities for what was the equiva-
lent of a family’s monthly income. Such a nearly unconstrained
alignment of payoffs and probabilities is not evident in any of
the real-world ecologies we examined.
Figure 9. Relationship between payoffs and probabilities as realized in laboratory investigations of prominent
theories of risky choice. Note that Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig (2006) used many of the gambles from
the other investigations in the plot, including Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1992),
Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, and Ritov (1997), and Lopes and Oden (1999). Because of the variety of gambles, we
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Unlike Brunswik, who often treated representative and systematic
design as antagonistic tools, we believe that there is a division of labor
between them (Dhami et al., 2004). For instance, if the goal is to
evaluate competing choice models, then research is likely to rely on
systematically designed stimuli that discriminate between them. If the
goal is to understand how an organism functions and performs in an
uncertain environment, then representative design is likely to be the
method of choice. Employing representative and systematic designs
as complimentary tools promises novel questions. For example, do
violations of axioms of normative choice theories such as the sure-
thing principle, substitution axiom, and transitivity generalize to in-
vestigations implementing representative designs, or are they re-
stricted to the stimuli systematically designed to demonstrate
them? Relatedly, does our limited ability to predict real-world
risk taking improve when choice models are estimated in ex-
perimental choice environments that are representative of the
gambles in the real world? Indeed, some evidence suggests that
individual investors prefer stocks that share the same structural
features as lottery tickets (Kumar, 2009).
Conclusion
Risk and reward: We have shown with ecological analyses that
these two variables are often intimately tied in a wide range of
environments that people experience and make decisions in every
day. Moreover, we propose and provide some evidence that this
ecological relationship enters the process by which people make
decisions in the form of the risk–reward heuristic. This heuristic is one
tool that empowers people to navigate uncertainty by inferring an
unknown probability of a payoff from the magnitude of the payoff
itself. These findings challenge the often reductionist approach of
theories of decision making under risk and uncertainty, which seek to
understand decision making by decomposing complex real-world
risky decisions into choices between monetary lotteries that are de-
fined by the independent constructs of payoffs and probabilities. An
adaptive view of rational choice, however, suggests that this is a
questionable approach. In real environments, these two constructs are
often not independent, and people appear to exploit their dependency.
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Description of Bayesian Analysis Methods
Bayesian Hierarchical Model of Pearson r
The following code describes the implementation of the Bayesian hierarchical model of Pearson r:
model {
#Likelihood
for (i in 1:n ) {
x[i,1:2]  dmnorm(mu[groupj[i],1:2],T1[,])
}





muG1  dnorm(0, 1.0E-12)















Data supplied from outside the JAGS software:
• x  matrix with two columns, one for each observed variable, with a length of the number of
observations.
• groupj  column vector denoting group membership of each pair of observations.
Bayesian Beta Regression Model
The following code describes the implementation of the Bayesian beta regression model:
model {
for(i in 1: Ntotal) {
y[i]  dbeta(a[i], b[i])
a[i] <- mu[i]tau
b[i] <- (1−mu[i])tau
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b0  dnorm(0, 1.0E-12)
b1  dnorm(0, 1.0E-12)
tauinv  dgamma(.1, 0.1)
tau <- 1/tauinv
}
Data supplied from outside JAGS:
• Ntotal  number of independent observations.
• y  observed estimates of the number in the envelope, scaled to be between .0001 and .9999.
• x  dollar value of the payoff.
Appendix B
Estimation Procedure for the Probabilities of Fair Bets for Multiple-Outcome Gambles
Our solution for estimating the probabilities of gambles that
offer the chance to win more than a single possible payoff in
exchange for a fixed loss (e.g., state lotteries) that make them fair
requires an estimate of the expected gain given that one has won,
EV(gain|win). This process involves three steps.
Step 1
Estimate the probability of a loss assuming fair bets. In multiple-
outcome gambles like scratch-off tickets, where there is a fixed
cost l for a possibility of a range of payoffs, the gamble is fair
when
(1 pl) · EVgain|win) pl · l,
where EV(gain|win) is the expected gain conditional on a win. The




In our calculations, we set the expected gain conditional on a win
to EV(gain|win)  $2.75. This value is roughly equal to the
average gain in our sample of scratch-off lotteries.
Step 2
Estimate the conditional probabilities of each of the possible i
1, 2, . . . , n gains given that one has won pi
* using the value of
EV(gain|win) from Step 1. Setting
EV(gain|win) p1* · x1 p2* · x2 . . .pi* · xi . . .pn* · xn,
where x1 x2 . . . xi . . . xn andi1n pi* 1. Clearly, when
there are more than two payoffs, there are not enough constraints
to estimate each of the probabilities individually. To work around
this problem, we estimated each of the probabilities for outcomes
x2 through xn conditional on winning and the payoff not being x1
using the expression for the probability of a gain for a fair bet with
single possible gain (see Equation 3 in the main text), so that for





To make them probabilities, the estimates are normalized to sum to





 j2n rj · xj x1
.
The remaining conditional probabilities for j  2 . . . n are found
as follows:
pj
* 1 p1* · rj.
Step 3
Find the unconditional probability p of a payoff for each gain by
multiplying each conditional probability pi
* with (1  pl) (see Step
1), so that for i  1, . . . , n,
pi (1 pl) · pi*.
This process was used to estimate the probabilities shown in
Figures 8B, 8C, and 8D in the main text. On average, the absolute
deviation between the estimated probabilities and true probabilities
in the lottery tickets was .017.
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